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INTRODUCTION
In Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi,1 the Delaware Supreme Court held that federalforum provisions in Delaware certificates of incorporation are valid under
§ 102(b)(1) of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware.2
While these provisions may be valid under the language of § 102(b)(1),
Salzberg begs the question of whether its construction of § 102(b)(1)––
rendering federal-forum provisions valid as a matter of Delaware
corporate law––causes § 102(b)(1) to violate the Supremacy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution.3 This Comment analyzes this question, and it concludes
that after Salzberg, § 102(b)(1) indeed violates the Supremacy Clause to the
extent that it validates federal-forum provisions.
This Comment first recounts relevant portions of the Salzberg opinion
in Part I. In Part II, this Comment considers germane Supremacy Clause
jurisprudence. Finally, Part III concludes that Salzberg’s construction of
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1 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020).
2 DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 102(b)(1) (2020). Federal-forum provisions are forumselection clauses that provide that plaintiffs seeking to bring claims arising out of the
contract at issue must bring such claims in a federal forum. See, e.g., Salzberg, 227 A.3d at
109.
3 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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the application of § 102(b)(1) to federal-forum provisions renders the
statute violative of the Supremacy Clause, explains this conclusion, and
identifies a harm that Salzberg threatens.
SALZBERG V. SCIABACUCCHI
Matthew Sciabacucchi purchased shares in three Delaware
corporations.4 Each of the three corporations had federal-forum
provisions in their certificates of incorporation that required claims under
the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Act”)5 to be filed in federal
courts.6 Sciabacucchi challenged these “federal-forum provisions” under
Delaware law.7 The Delaware Court of Chancery held the provisions were
invalid, reasoning that “constitutive documents of a Delaware corporation
cannot bind a plaintiff to a particular forum when the claim does not
involve rights or relationships that were established under Delaware’s
corporate law.”8
In Salzberg, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed.9 The court first
recounted relevant sections of the Act. Most importantly, the Act
explicitly allows plaintiffs to bring claims under the Act in either federal or
state court.10 Moreover, the Act provides that when a plaintiff brings a
claim under it in state court, the defendant may not remove the claim to
federal court.11
The Delaware Supreme Court then turned to § 102(b)(1). Section
102(b)(1) broadly provides, “[T]he certificate of incorporation [may
contain a provision] for the management of the business and for the
conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and any provision creating,
Salzberg, 227 A.3d at 109.
See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2018).
6 Salzberg, 227 A.3d at 111–12.
7 Id. at 112.
8 Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, No. 2017-0931-JTL, 2018 WL 6719718, at *3 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 19, 2018).
9 Salzberg, 227 A.3d at 138.
10 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a). For background on the history and controversy surrounding
the proper venue for claims under the Act, see generally GIBSON DUNN, SUPREME
COURT HOLDS STATES MAY HEAR SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS UNDER THE
1933 ACT; LAURI SMILAN & NICKI LOCKER, Saying So Long to State Court Securities
Litigation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 11, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/11/saying-so-long-to-state-court-securitieslitigation/.
11 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a).
4
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defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the corporation, the
directors, and the stockholders . . . .”12 Relying on § 102(b)(1), the court
held that federal-forum provisions are valid.13 At its core, the court
reasoned that § 102(b)(1)’s broad language permits private ordering of a
corporation’s affairs and that federal-forum provisions are part of the
management of a corporation’s business and means of exercising control
over the powers of the corporation and its constituents.14
However, the court’s analysis rested entirely on its interpretation of §
102(b)(1) as applied in the context of litigation under the Act. The court
did not consider whether the statute’s application to federal-forum
provisions comports with the Supremacy Clause.15
THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
The Supremacy Clause provides that federal law is the “supreme Law
of the Land” and that “every State shall be bound [by federal law], any
Thing in the . . . Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”16
Stated more simply, when federal law and state law conflict, federal law
“preempts” the state law and governs over it.17 Preemption can occur in a
number of ways,18 but most pertinently, “field preemption” occurs when
Congress intends to displace a state’s ability to regulate in a field or when
Congress’s interest in regulating a given field is particularly influential.19
However, legal issues under the Supremacy Clause extend beyond
preemption. Indeed, the Clause prohibits states from acting in
contravention of federal action or otherwise interfering with federal
DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 102(b)(1) (2020).
Salzberg, 227 A.3d at 114. The holding related specifically to the provisions at issue
in the case, but the holding broadly suggests that federal-forum provisions are generally
valid.
14 Id. at 113–14. The court continued for some length, discussing the difference
between “internal affairs” claims, intra-corporate claims, and external claims and
concluding that the claims at issue were not external claims and thus the federal-forum
provisions were valid under § 102(b)(1). See generally id. at 120–32. This Comment omits
this discussion because it is immaterial to its thesis.
15 Of course, the plaintiffs did not challenge the constitutionality of § 102(b)(1), so
that issue was not before the court.
16 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
17 CALVIN MASSEY & BRANNON P. DENNING, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
POWERS AND LIBERTIES 321 (6th ed. 2019).
18 See generally id. at 321–23 (explaining that when Congress intends to preempt state
law, “it does so either expressly or by implication”).
19 Id. at 322.
12
13
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rights.20 Notably, states may not refuse to enforce federal laws or federally
granted rights.21 Therefore, the Supreme Court has held states may not
without “valid excuse” refuse to hear a class of cases simply because those
cases are based on a question of federal law.22 Federalism requires this
result. As the Court stated in Howlett ex rel. Howlett v. Rose:
Federal law is enforceable in state courts not because Congress
has determined that federal courts would otherwise be
burdened or that state courts might provide a more convenient
forum—although both might well be true—but because the
Constitution and laws passed pursuant to it are as much laws in
the States as laws passed by the [states]. The Supremacy Clause . . .
charges state courts with a coordinate responsibility to enforce [federal] law
. . . . The two together form one system of jurisprudence, which
constitutes the law of the land for the State[,] and the courts of
the two jurisdictions are . . . courts of the same country, having
jurisdiction partly different and partly concurrent.23

Citing Howlett, at least one court has explicitly recognized that states
may not discriminate against federal causes of action and thus must
equally adjudicate federal causes of action before their courts.24 It is worth
recognizing there is an exception to the general rule that states must hear
and process properly filed federal claims. Specifically, a state may refuse to
adjudicate individual cases when necessary for efficient administration of the
state’s courts.25
SALZBERG RENDERS § 102(B)(1) VIOLATIVE
OF THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
With this brief background on the Salzberg opinion and the Supremacy
Clause in the backdrop, an inescapable conclusion emerges: Salzberg’s
interpretation of § 102(b)(1) renders it violative of the Supremacy Clause
and therefore unconstitutional as applied to federal-forum provisions.

See Howlett ex rel. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367–73 (1990).
Id. at 369.
22 Id. (quoting Douglas v. New York, 279 U.S. 377, 387–88 (1929)).
23 Id. at 367 (emphasis added).
24 See R.A. Ponte Architects, Ltd. v. Invs.’ Alert, Inc., 857 A.2d 1, 7 (Md. 2004) (citing
Howlett, 496 U.S. at 366).
25 See Howlett, 496 U.S. at 374–75. Thus, for example, states may grant change of
venue motions on forum non-conveniens grounds in appropriate cases. Id. at 375.
20
21
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As a preliminary matter, there is a reasonable argument that field
preemption alone renders § 102(b)(1) unconstitutional as interpreted in
Salzberg. The Act and related legislation provide a comprehensive, detailed
statutory framework that provides for federal remedies (including by
expressly offering plaintiffs their choice of a federal or state forum), and
Congress has important interests in monitoring securities law enforcement
(e.g., protecting investors, assuring the integrity of securities markets, and
promoting capital formation).26 These interests alone arguably suffice to
effectuate field preemption.27
More importantly, though, the Act explicitly states that plaintiffs who
bring claims under the Act may bring their claims either in federal or state
court.28 Similarly, the Act provides that a defendant may not remove a
claim to federal court after a plaintiff files in state court.29 These two
provisions demonstrate Congress’s intent to ensure plaintiffs have
adequate avenues––and the discretion to choose among those avenues––
through which they may seek recourse for violations of the Act in both
federal and state court. Accordingly, specific statutory language
concerning private enforcement discretion, too, supports a finding of field
preemption.
Irrespective of preemption, however, it is sufficient that under Howlett,
states may not outsource a class of federal claims to federal courts because
doing so contravenes interests in federalism. Consequently, § 102(b)(1) as
interpreted in Salzberg violates the Supremacy Clause because it constitutes
state action, through corporate authorization to effectually outsource
numerous classes of federal securities claims to federal courts. It is true
that the statute itself does not expressly outsource federal claims.
Nevertheless, the statute violates the Supremacy Clause because it permits
corporations––which are creatures of state law (unlike private

See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2018).
Of course, states can and do legally enact securities laws as well. See, e.g., Patrick J.
McGinley, When Does Florida’s Sunshine Law Apply?, 24 WEST’S FLA. PRAC. SERIES: FLA.
MUN. L. & PRAC. § 10.3 (2020). However, these laws may not themselves contravene
federal securities laws. See generally Howlett, 496 U.S. at 372 (explaining that states have
“great latitude” when forming “the structure and jurisdiction of their own courts”).
28 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a).
29 Id.
26
27
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individuals)––to unilaterally outsource federal claims to federal courts.30
Other sources support this thesis.31
A skeptic may counter this Comment with an argument that the “valid
excuse” exception should permit Delaware to outsource federal securities
claims to federal courts on grounds that it is inconvenient for Delaware
courts to hear the claims. But this argument is to no avail. The “valid
excuse” exception applies only when it is inconvenient for a state court to
adjudicate an individual case.32 On the other hand, the exception does not
allow a state court to delegate an entire class of cases to federal court
merely because adjudicating those cases requires extra effort.33
Finally, it is important to recognize the harm Salzberg and the
corresponding Supremacy Clause violation causes. When corporations
enact federal-forum provisions, they require potential plaintiffs to seek
relief in federal courts. This requirement is problematic for plaintiffs
because some states have less exacting pleading standards (e.g., notice
pleading) than the federal jurisdiction (i.e., plausible pleading), and this
heightened standard renders it more costly for plaintiffs to mount claims
under the Act.34 As a result, federal-forum provisions license corporations
Cf. Patrick R. Baker, Paula H. Moore, & Kaleb P. Byars, Unclaimed Property:
Uncertainty with Tennessee’s Adoption of the Revised Uniform Unclaimed Property Act and Related
Income Tax Liability, 45 J. BUS. & ECON. PERSPS. 90, 95–96, 98 (2018) (discussing the
derivative rights doctrine and the notion that a state may not delegate to private
individuals a right that the state itself does not possess). It will be interesting to analyze
whether the number of federal-forum provisions in corporate charters increases
substantially after Salzberg. That type of trend would support that Salzberg allows precisely
what Howlett prohibited: state courts’ refusal to decide a class of cases based on a federal
issue. Howlett, 496 U.S. at 369 (quoting Douglas v. New York, 279 U.S. 377, 387–88
(1929)).
31 See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Forum Non
Conveniens at 14–16, In re Dropbox, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 19-CIV-05089 (Cal. App. Dep’t
Super. Ct. June 10, 2020); Alison Frankel, Are Delaware Federal Forum Selection Clauses
Unconstitutional?, REUTERS (Sept. 8, 2020, 5:35 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/le
gal-us-otc-forum/are-delaware-federal-forum-selection-clauses-unconstitutionalidUSKBN25Z375.
32 See Howlett, 496 U.S. at 374–75.
33 See id. (quoting Douglas, 279 U.S. at 387–88).
34 Compare Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)) (plausible pleading standard), with Webb v. Nashville
Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 426 (Tenn. 2011) (notice pleading
standard), and Champagne v. Thurston Cnty., 178 P.3d 936, 945 (Wash. 2008) (notice
pleading standard). See generally James E. von der Heydt, Ripple Effects: The Unintended
30
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and their management constituents (likely with disproportionate
bargaining power and wealth) to direct plaintiffs that sue them to a venue
where the standard to survive a motion to dismiss is more likely to be
dispositive of their cases. Of course, this harm itself causes a collateral
harm. Namely, if less securities claims reach at least the summary
judgment stage (where courts may decide the claims on the merits),
securities law will necessarily remain under-litigated, and the federal system
of securities regulation will consequently be less transparent.35 Resultingly,
investor protection and market integrity will be less secure, and fewer
investors may be willing to participate in national securities markets. Thus,
Salzberg’s holding undermines the paramount goals of the Act.36
CONCLUSION
The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Salzberg causes § 102(b)(1)
to violate the Supremacy Clause. This is so because the Securities Act of
1933 clearly expresses intent for securities claims to be adjudicated in both
state and federal courts and because § 102(b)(1) after Salzberg improperly
allows corporations, which are creatures of state law, to outsource all
securities claims to federal court. The Salzberg decision will cause concrete
harm to plaintiffs by subjecting them to a heightened pleading standard,
and it will result in less secure investor protection and market integrity.
Future plaintiffs should challenge § 102(b)(1) under the Supremacy Clause
to avoid these harms.

Change to Jurisdictional Pleading Standards After Iqbal, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 799 (2012)
(discussing, inter alia, different pleading standards).
35 This Comment recognizes the potential counterargument that its thesis may cause
inefficiency via a greater number of concurrent suits in state and federal courts. However,
abstention doctrines will mitigate these costs. Moreover, the fact that a constitutional
commandment imposes costs does not render the constitutional commandment
ineffective.
36 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2018).

